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Russell Brown* Assumption of Responsibility and Loss
of Bargain in Tort Law
The author seeks to justify recovery in negligence law for loss of bargain, which
is the pure economic loss incurred by a subsequent purchaser of a defective
product or building structure in seeking to repair the defect. The difficulty is that
the purchaser is not in a relationship of contractual privity with the manufacturer
The conflicting approaches in Anglo-American tort law reveal confusion, owing
to loss of bargain's dual implication of the law governing pure economic loss
and products liability. These difficulties are overcome by drawing from Hedley
Byrne's requirements of a defendant's assumption of responsibility and a plaintiff's
reasonable reliance, and by casting the damaged interest as that of the plaintiff's
own autonomy. In doing so, the doctrine of assumption of responsibility is
encapsulated, and the case for its extension to loss of bargain cases is made
with reference to early U.S. products liability jurisprudence.
L'auteur cherche justifier le recouvrement, dans les regles du droit relatives 6
la negligence, de la , perte d'un march6 -, soit la perte purement 6conomique
subie par un acqu6reur subsequent d'un immeuble ou d'un produit ddfectueux
qui demande compensation pour les vices. La difficult6 d6coule du fait qu'il
n'y a aucun lien contractuel entre I'acheteur et le fabricant. Les approches
contradictoires en droit anglo-am6ricain de la responsabilit6 civile dlictuelle
rv~lent la confusion qui regne 6 cet 6gard utant donn6 que la perte de march6
met en cause tant le droit applicable 6 la perte purement 6conomique que le
droit relatif 6 la responsabilit6 du fait du produit. II est possible de surmonter
ces difficultes en extrapolant des exigences enonc6es dans 'arrt Hedley Byrne
la presomption de responsabilitd de la partie ddfenderesse et de la confiance
raisonnable de la partie demanderesse et en declarant que les dommages
subis ont trait I'autonomie de la partie demanderesse. Ainsi, la doctrine de
I'endossement de la responsabilit6 est bien cadr6e, et I'argument voulant
qu'elle soit 6tendue aux affaires de perte de march6 est bien assis et reli6 6 la
jurisprudence am6ricaine anterieure sur la responsabilit6 du fait du produit.
*Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta (rbrown@law.ualberta.ca). I am grateful
to Allan Beever, Lewis Klar, Geoff McLay and Jason Neyers for their suggestions after reviewing a
draft copy of this paper. I have also benefited from discussions with Peter Benson, Bruce Chapman,
Mayo Moran, Stephen Perry, Stephen Waddams and Moin Yahya.
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Introduction
My objective in this article is to justify recovery in the tort of negligence
for what I shall refer to as loss of bargain. At stake is the recoverability
of the pure economic loss incurred by a subsequent purchaser' of a
defective product or building structure2 in seeking to repair the defect and
restore the bargain which had been anticipated. The essential problem
to be overcome is that such a purchaser is not in a relationship of privily
with the manufacturer and therefore cannot assert a claim for damages
under the law of contract. As such, I will confront the thorny question of
whether the subsequent purchaser's expectations should, where they have
been dashed by defective manufacture, be treated as a protected interest in
tort law - specifically, the law of negligence - and whether the law ought
to require the manufacturer to restore such expectations by awarding
damages reflecting the cost of repair.
My inquiry is complicated by its engagement of two persistently
confounding aspects of tort law. First, it touches upon the law governing
recovery of pure economic loss, with which tort jurists continue to grapple
1. By "subsequent purchaser," I refer to a purchaser after the original purchaser usually a consumer
purchaser - on the distributive chain. The subsequent purchaser is also known as a "remote purchaser."
(Jane Stapleton, "Benefits of Comparative Tort Reasoning: Lost in Translation," forthcoming in (2006)
1 J. Tort L.).
2. Defective products and defective building structures have commonly been treated synonymously
- that is, building structures as "products" and builders as "manufacturers" - in reliance on Lord
Keith's statement in Murphy v. BrentwoodDistrict Council(1990), [1991] 1 A.C. 398, [1990] 3 W.L.R.
414, [1990] 2 All E.R. 908 (H.L.) [Murphy cited to All E.R.] at 921: "[i]f the builder of the house is to
be [subject to a duty of care], there can be no grounds in logic or in principle for not extending liability
on like grounds to the manufacturer of a chattel." See also S.M. Waddams, Products Liability, 3d ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1993) [Waddams, Products Liability] at 25-26.
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by offering various rationales for its non-recoverability.3 Additionally,
cases of defective products or building structures represent a subset of
the law of products liability which, as John Fleming observed nearly
thirty years ago (and as Stephen Waddams has recently affirmed) is "not
yet a coherent concept of our law."'4 Here, current governing principles
constitute a mixture of strict liability, imposed by way of statutory implied
warranties, and negligence law. My task, then, implicates subjects of
live concern. Efforts to make legitimate space for tort law in loss of
bargain cases must also account for the objection that tort law would be
operating in such a manner as to distort its own parameters or those of
other areas of private law. The fundamental challenge to my justificatory
inquiry here is the orthodoxy that the contract to which the manufacturer
subscribed should, in the absence of injury to person or property, delimit
its obligations.
The divergent paths which Anglo-American courts have followed in
cases of lost bargain demonstrate the confusion generated by commingling
products liability with pure economic loss. After a series of 1970s decisions
in which English courts allowed recovery by eschewing all distinction
between such loss and loss arising from physical damage,6 they retreated7
and later rejected recovery altogether in Murphy v. Brentwood District
Council.' English law has since applied a strict exclusionary rule. In
3. See, for example, Allan Beever: "A Rights-Based Approach to the Recovery of Economic Loss
in Negligence" (2004) 4 Oxford U. Comm. L.J. 25; Peter Benson, "The Basis for Excluding Liability
for Economic Loss in Tort Law" in David Owen, ed., Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995) at 427; W. Bishop, "Economic Loss in Tort" (1982) 2 Oxford J. Leg. Stud.
1; Fleming James, "Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic
Appraisal" (1972) 25 Vand. L. Rev. 43; and Mario J. Rizzo, "A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law
of Torts" (1982) 11 J. Leg. Stud. 281.
4. John G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 51 ed. (Sydney: The Law Book Co. Ltd., 1977) at 498; and
Stephen M. Waddams, "New Directions in Products Liability," in Nicholas J. Mullany and Allen M.
Linden, A Tribute to John Fleming (Sydney North Ryde, N.S.W.: LBC Information Services, 1998).
5. Bruce Feldthusen, "Winnipeg Condominium Corporation No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co. Ltd:
Who Needs Contract Anymore?" (1995) 25 Can. Bus. L.J. 143; and Bruce Feldthusen & John Palmer,
"Economic Loss and the Supreme Court of Canada: An Economic Critique of Norsk Steamship and
Bird Construction" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 427.
6. See Dutton v. Bognor Regis United Building Co. Ltd., [1972] 1 Q.B. 373, [1972] 1 All E.R. 462
(C.A.) [Dutton]; and Anns v. Merton Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728, [1977] 2All ER. 492 (H.L.)
[Anns cited to All E.R.]. This trend reached its apogee in Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd., [1983]
1 A.C. 520, [1982] 3 All E.R. 201 (H.L.).
7. Leigh & Sillivan Ltd. v. The Aliakmon Shipping Ltd. (1984), [1985] Q.B. 350, [1985] 2 All E.R.
44 at 58 (C.A.), afl"d [1986] A.C. 785, [1986] 2 All E.R. 145 (H.L.); Aswan Engineering v. Lupdine
Ltd. (1986), [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1, [1987] 1 All E.R. 135 (C.A.) (particularly Lloyd L.J.'s speech at 151-
53).
8. Murphy, supra note 2.
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the United States, both the Third Restatement9 and the Supreme Court 0
have also rejected recovery in tort for loss of bargain. Australian and New
Zealand decisions do, however, allow it.II
Canadian law has evolved over the past three decades from the
exclusionary rule 2 to a middle-ground position staked by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird
Construction Co. 3 There, La Forest J. (for the Court) cited "compelling
policy reasons"'4 for the imposition of liability in tort upon manufacturers
of buildings" where the defect at issue (in that case, improperly installed
exterior stone cladding on a condominium building) was "not merely
shoddy" but "dangerous". 5 As to those policy reasons, he reasoned that the
exclusionary rule penalizes the responsible property owner who promptly
repairs a defect before it causes injury, while rewarding the plaintiff who
recklessly defers repairs."
There is an intuitive logic to La Forest J.'s argument in Winnipeg
Condominium that a manufacturer, which would be liable where its
negligence causes physical damage, ought also to be liable where a
dangerous defect is discovered and mitigated or remedied before physical
damage occurs. Or, as Brennan J. (as he then was) said in Bryan v.
9. Restatement (Third), Torts: Products Liability §21 (c).
10. East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2295, 476 U.S. 858 (1986)
[East River cited to U.S.].
11. This applies only to building structures and, in New Zealand, perhaps only to residential
structures. See Stieller v. Porirua City Council, [1986] 1 N.Z.L.R. 84 (C.A.); Invercargill City
Council v. Hamlin, [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R. 513 (C.A.), aff'd [1996] A.C. 624, [1996] 2 W.L.R. 367, [1996]
1 N.Z.L.R. 513 (P.C.); Three Meade Street Ltd v. Rotorua District Council, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 504
(H.C.) [Three Meade]; and Bryan v. Maloney (1995), 182 C.L.R. 609, 128 A.L.R. 163 (H.C.A.)
[Bryan v. Maloney cited to A.L.R.]. The law in New Zealand may, however, be shifting towards an
exclusionary rule - see the Court of Appeal's decision in Rolls Royce New Zealand Ltd v. Carter Holt
Harvey Ltd, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 324 (C.A.). Moreover, a majority at the High Court of Australia has
recently cast doubt on the authority of Bryan v. Maloney, although it refrained from overruling it. (See
Woolcock St Investments Pty Ltd v. CDG Pty Ltd (2005), 216 C.L.R. 515 (H.C.A.).)
12. Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works,[1974] S.C.R. 1189, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530, [197316
W.W.R. 692.
13. Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction Co., [ 1995] 1 S.C.R. 85, 121 D.L.R.
(4 1h) 193, [1995] 3 W.W.R. 85 [Winnipeg Condominium cited to D.L.R.].
14. Ibid. at 199. Although La Forest J. referred only to "buildings," his substantial reliance on Laskin
J.'s dissent in Rivtow, supra note 12 (which involved a defective crane) suggests that La Forest J.'s
reasoning was likely intended to apply to products as well. The Ontario Court of Appeal has also
applied Winnipeg Condominium in a case involving allegedly defective smoke alarms. (See Hughes
v. Sunbeam Corporation Canada Ltd. (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 433, 219 D.L.R. (41) 467 (C.A.).)
15. Ibid. At 215, LaForest J. expressly left the door open to follow the Australian and New Zealand
courts in allowing recovery irrespective of danger but, lacking "argument more squarely focused on
[that] issue," demurred.
16. Ibid. at 223. The exclusionary rule, as he expressed it, "provides no incentive for plaintiffs to
mitigate potential losses and tends to encourage economically inefficient behaviour."
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Maloney,7 dissenting from the majority's decision allowing recovery for
loss of bargain,
it is right that the party incurring it should be indemnified by the party
who, if the risk had materialized and physical damage had occurred, would
have been primarily liable to the third party suffering that damage.'8
This argument's force is amplified where the plaintiff presents himself or
herself as having incurred repair expenses not to avoid a bad bargain, but to
preserve the bargain, the value of which is threatened by the manufacturer's
negligence. On this reasoning, it seems a small step to extend tort law's
reach to embrace the cost of repairing the structure or product altogether.
The difficulty, however, is the objection which I have already identified,
voiced by some commentators (notably Dean Bruce Feldthusen), that the
manufacturer's contract with the original purchaser ought to govern the
scope of its liability.'9 In this article, I will construct an account by which
tort law can properly - that is, without distorting the boundaries of tort
law or contract law - be understood as imposing liability in cases of lost
bargain, even in the absence of privity between the parties or physical
damage. The critical element justifying liability will be shown to be
the subsequent purchaser's detrimental reliance on an undertaking or
assumption of responsibility - the touchstone of liability under Hedley
Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners2" - given by the defendant manufacturer.
My argument here does not entail acceptance that economic interests are,
without more, protected interests in the law of negligence. Rather, as I
will explain, the loss in cases involving a subsequent purchaser's reliance
on a manufacturer's undertaking is properly regarded as injury to a legally
protected interest in his or her own autonomy.2' Thus while Donoghue v.
Stevenson addresses physical damage to person or property, Hedley Byrne
will be shown to address interference with a person's right in his or her
personal autonomy to choose among different courses of action.
In making this case, I will first encapsulate the doctrine of assumption
of responsibility as it was articulated in Hedley Byrne. I will then proceed
17. Supra note 11.
18. Ibid. at 189. See also Woodhouse J.'s reasons in Bowen v. Paramount Builders (Hamilton) Ltd.
(1976), [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 394 (C.A.) [Bowen] at 417: "It would seem only common sense to take
steps to avoid a serious loss by repairing a defect before it will cause physical damage and rather
extraordinary if the greater loss when the building fall (sic) down could be recovered from the careless
builder but the cost of timely repairs could not."
19. See supra note 5.
20. Hedley Byrne& Co. v. Heller& Partners (1963), [1964] A.C. 465,[196312 All E.R. 575 (H.L.)
[Hedley Byrne cited to All E.R.].
21. Stephen R. Perry, "Protected Interests and Undertakings in the Law of Negligence" (1992) 42
U.T.L.J. 247 [Perry, "Protected Interests"] at 250.
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to argue for the extension of that doctrine to loss of bargain cases by
illustrating how development of this aspect of tort law might helpfully
draw more deeply, first, from a broader understanding of the doctrine of
assumption of responsibility and, secondly, from U.S. products liability
jurisprudence. I will, however, also conclude by suggesting that while
the doctrine of assumption of responsibility holds particular promise for
plaintiffs in loss of bargain cases involving defective consumer products,
it may have a more limited application - or, more correctly, recovery will
be more difficult (although not impossible) to achieve - in cases involving
defective building structures.
I. The doctrine of assumption of responsibility
That loss of bargain is a species of pure economic loss is not conclusive
of its (non)recoverability. As Hedley Byrne demonstrates, tort law does
not recognize an all-embracing exclusionary rule for economic loss. But
for the defendant's disclaimer in that case, the House of Lords would have
imposed liability for pure economic loss arising from the defendant's
negligent misrepresentation. Can, however, such a duty be extended to
the relationship between manufacturers and subsequent purchasers who
have suffered pure economic loss resulting from a lost bargain? Although
Hedley Byrne's scope has not been without controversy,22 and despite
its having been effectively confined by the House of Lords to cases of
fiduciary relations or negligent misrepresentation, 23 I propose that its
application, properly understood, transcends such confines and remains
relevant (indeed critical) to the liability inquiry here.
In Hedley Byrne, the House of Lords articulated a broad principle of
tort liability, which was summarized in Lord Morris's speech:
My lords, I consider that it follows that it should now be regarded as
22. Hedley Byrne's scope has been variously described. J.C. Smith cited it as "an extension of the
Donoghue v. Stevenson principle" (see J.C. Smith, "Economic Loss and the Common Law Marriage
of Contract and Torts" (1984) 18 U.B.C. L. Rev. 95 at 99). Writing with Peter Bums, Smith had one
year earlier described Hedley Byrne in the narrowest of terms, citing it as a basis for liability from pure
economic loss resulting from negligent misrepresentation in limited circumstances. (See J.C. Smith
and Peter Bums, "Donoghue v. Stevenson - The Not so Golden Anniversary" (1983) 46 Mod. L. Rev.
147. Stephen Perry had taken a broader view, seeing Hedley Byrne as a manifestation of "overlap"
with the Donoghue v. Stevenson principle. (Perry, "Protected Interests", supra note 21 at 288.) Even
more ambitiously, the Supreme Court of Canada has cited Hedley Byrne as authority for the proposition
that "where liability is based on negligence the recovery is not limited to physical damage but also
extends to economic loss." (Rivtow, supra note 12 at 546.) For a review of the disparate viewpoints
on Hedley Byrne's scope found in recent English jurisprudence, see Paul Mitchell & Charles Mitchell,
"Negligence Liability for Pure Economic Loss" (2005) 121 Law Q. Rev. 194 at 194-97.
23. See White v. Jones, [1995] 2A.C. 207,[1995] 1 All E.R. 691 (H.L.) [White v. Jones cited toA.C.]
at 274 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. This was affirmed by Lord Mance in Commissioners of Customs
and Excise v. Barclays Bank plc, [2006] UKHL 28, [2006] 4 All E.R. 256 [Barclays Bank] at para.
92.
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settled that if someone possessed of a special skill undertakes, quite
irrespective of contract, to apply that skill for the assistance of another
person who relies on such skill, a duty of care will arise. The fact that
the service is to be given by means of, or by the instrumentality of, words
can make no difference. Furthermore if, in a sphere which a person is
so placed that others could reasonably rely on his judgment or skill or
on his ability to make a careful inquiry, a person takes it on himself to
give information or advice to, or allows his information or advice to be
passed on to, another person who, as he knows or should know, will
place reliance on it, then a duty of care will arise.24
For the House of Lords, a protected interest is founded, first, on a notion of
undertaking to employ a special skill for the assistance of another person.
Indeed, all five Law Lords accepted that an undertaking can, in part,
ground a right arising in its recipient.25 Secondly, the defendant's liability
depends on the plaintiff having reasonably and detrimentally relied on
the defendant's undertaking. From this statement, then, we can extract
two fundamental components - undertaking and reliance - which, taken
together, generate a legally protected interest in the plaintiff. As such, they
merit deeper consideration.
1. The undertaking
The House of Lords in Hedley Byrne did not seize the notion of
"undertaking" from thin air. Its pedigree is substantial, having been
specifically cited by Holt C.J. and Powell J. in Coggs v. Bernard26
as the basis for the defendant bailee's liability. Lord Abinger
C.B. also referred, in Winterbottom v. Wright,27 to the necessity
of an undertaking as a precondition to imposing liability outside
the law of contract. As to what constitutes an undertaking, the
House of Lords required in Williams v. Natural Life Foods28 that it
amount to an "assumption of responsibility, .... conveyed directly or
indirectly" by which the undertaker "assumed personal responsibility" with
24. Ibid. at 594. This passage is scrutinized in Perry, "Protected Interests," supra note 21 at 271-
72.
25. Ibid. Lord Reid spoke of an "undertaking of responsibility." Lord Hodson (at 599) referred to
"taking responsibility." Lord Devlin said that "(t)he essence of the matter ... is the acceptance of
responsibility" (at 612). Lord Pearce inquired as to whether "a duty of care ... was assumed" (at 618).
The Lords also unanimously absolved the defendant of liability on the basis of the disclaimer which
had accompanied the impugned misrepresentation.
26. Coggs v. Bernard, (1703), 2 Raym. Ld. 909, 92 E.R. 107 (K.B.) [Coggs v. Bernard cited to
Raym. Ld.] at 912 and 910, respectively.
27. Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842), 10 M. & W. 108, 152 E.R. 402 (Exch.).
28. Williams v. Natural Life Foods, [1998] 2 All E.R. 577, [1998] 1 W.L.R. 830 (H.L.) [Williams
cited to W.L.R.].
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regard to the referenced act. 29 By "assum[ing] personal responsibility," I
mean that it indicates a general, objective manifestation of an "intention
to induce another person to believe that he or she may rely"30 on the
undertaker to act (or refrain from acting) in a certain way.
Williams involved the allegedly negligent provision of advice, and so
the objective conduct which the House of Lords considered (and determined
to fall short of an undertaking to be responsible for the quality of advice)
is not specifically applicable here. The House of Lords has, however,
since identified the "breadth of the principle"31 underlying Hedley Byrne
in less particular terms. In Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd., Lord
Goff (speaking for the House) identified the principle in Hedley Byrne as
resting "upon a relationship between the parties, which may be general or
specific to the particular transaction .... "32 He continued:
... the principle extends beyond the provision of information and advice
to include the performance of other services. It follows, of course, that
although, in the case of the provision of information and advice, reliance
upon it by the other party will be necessary to establish a cause of
action (because otherwise the negligence will have no causative effect),
nevertheless there may be other circumstances in which there will be the
necessary reliance to give rise to the application of the principle.33
Lord Goff's speech in Henderson carries important implications for the
argument I seek to advance here regarding the nature of the requisite
undertaking of responsibility. While he did not elaborate on the nature of
a "general relationship", its contrast with a relationship that is "specific"
to a "particular transaction" suggests that an undertaking that induces
corresponding reliance carries legal significance even if it is not restricted
to a particular individual or situation. That is, the contemplated relation
need not necessarily be fixed, direct or peculiar. It may involve an
undertaking given to a less confined or (as the term "general" suggests)
unconfined class of persons united only by the common and broad overall
29. Ibid. at 834. That assumption of personal responsibility, the House of Lords added, is to be
determined by reference to an objective test. "[T]he primary focus," the court stated (at 835), "must
be on things said or done by the defendant or on his behalf in dealings with the plaintiff."
30. Perry, Protected Interests, supra note 21 at 282. (1 am generally agreeing here with Perry's
argument at 281-82). The objective discernibility of that manifestation has recently been affirmed by
Lord Hoffmann in Barclays Bank, supra note 23 at para. 35: "[tlhe answer [to the question of whether
the defendant assumed responsibility] does not depend on what the defendant intended but, as in the
case of contractual liability, upon what would reasonably be inferred from his conduct against the
background of all the circumstances of the case."
31. Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd, [1995] 2 A.C. 145, [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761 (H.L.) at 180 (Lord
Goff). Concurring, Lord Browne-Wilkinson spoke (at 205) of Hedley Byrne's "general principle."
32. Ibid. at 180.
33. Ibid.
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characteristic of having a relationship, engendered by such reliance, with
the undertaking party. The scope of intended recipients of an undertaking,
then, would be defined by what Cardozo J. would have understood as its
"end and aim."34 Lord Goff's statement can be seen as simply recognizing
Hedley Byrne's inevitable consequence: circumstances beyond the Hedley
Byrne paradigm of one-to-one representations which nonetheless also
involve undertakings of responsibility may also generate the detrimental
reliance necessary to give rise to liability. The essential matter being the
undertaking of responsibility and the reliance it engenders, the judicial
inquiry does not require a specific, individualized relationship, but instead
ascribes legal significance to a generalized undertaking.35
The content of an "undertaking" can be further understood by
considering what it is not. In this regard, a notion of undertaking was
criticized at the House of Lords in the late 1980s and early 1990s, beginning
with Smith v. Eric S. Bush,36, although not on grounds that compromise the
normative function which I am claiming for it. There, Lord Templeman
cited Lord Denning MR's comments in Ministry of Housing and Local
Government v. Sharp,37 denying that "the duty to use due care in a
statement arises ... from any voluntary assumption of responsibility. 3 8
Lord Griffiths also doubted "that voluntary assumption of responsibility
is a helpful or realistic test for liability", adding that "[o]bviously, if an
adviser expressly assumes liability for his advice, a duty of care will arise,
but such is extremely unlikely in the ordinary course of events."39
Lords Templeman and Griffiths are, however, contemplating a
different kind of undertaking, specifically, an express assumption of
legal liability. Lord Griffiths' speech makes this clear by relying on the
presence in Hedley Byrne of an express disclaimer of responsibility for
the defendant's advice.4 ° This was affirmed in White v. Jones,a" where
Lord Browne-Wilkinson sought to "allay the doubts of the utility of the
concept of assumption of responsibility" voiced by Lord Griffiths in
Smith v. Eric S. Bush by clarifying that "the assumption of responsibility
34. Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170 (C.A., 193 1) at 182, 174 N.E. 441, 74 A.L.R.
1139. My point here is that the purpose of a representation will define the scope of those who are
owed a duty. If the purpose was mass communication, the "masses," where they reasonably and
detrimentally rely, can recover.
35. Here I am agreeing with Perry, "Protected Interests," supra note 21 at 305.
36. Smith v. Eric S. Bush, [1990] 1 A.C. 831, [1989] 2 All E.R. 514 (H.L.) [Eric S. Bush cited to All
E.R.].
37. Ministry of Housing and Local Government v. Sharp, [ 1970] 2 Q.B. 223, [1970] 1 All E.R. 1009
at 1018-19 (C.A.) [Sharp].
38. Ibid., cited in Eric S. Bush, supra note 36 at 522.
39. Eric S. Bush, supra note 36 at 534.
40. Ibid. at 529.
41. White v. Jones, supra note 23.
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referred to is ... not the assumption of legal liability."42 The Hedley Byrne
"undertaking", then, need not entail such an assumption which, as Lord
Griffiths acknowledged, would be "extremely unlikely in the ordinary
course of events. 43 Moreover, there is nothing in the Lords' speeches in
Hedley Byrne that remotely suggests that they intended to be viewed as
imposing such a requirement.
The undertaking I am privileging here instead was described by Lord
Browne-Wilkinson as the defendant's "assumption of responsibilityfor the
task."44 Or, as Lord Denning elaborated in Sharp, it entails an assumption
of responsibility to do something in a reasonable manner, demonstrated
where "the person making it knows, or ought to know, that others ... would
act on the faith of the statement being accurate" 45 (or, more precisely, on its
maker's having taken care to ensure its accuracy). Hence Stephen Perry's
equation of an undertaking with an assumption of responsibility which,
as a practical matter, can be inferred or implied from the facts using the
objective standard of the reasonable person. 46
The affinity between tort and contract here is strong, inasmuch as they
both engage a conception of liability which draws, at least in part, from the
manufacturer's assumed responsibilities. There is, however, an important
distinction. The critical co-determinant for tort liability, I will argue,
is whether the defendant's undertaking to engage in or to refrain from
particular conduct conferred upon the plaintiff a corresponding right to
rely on the defendant's ultimate discharge of that undertaking. Absent such
42. Ibid. at 273. White v. Jones, however, involved not a loss of bargain, but rather a claim for
the loss of a benefit asserted by disappointed beneficiaries against a solicitor for failing to attend
reasonably to his client's testamentary affairs. As such, it invites an additional objection to recovery,
which is that the plaintiffs were mere third-party beneficiaries to a contract who neither received nor
relied on any undertaking by the solicitor and as such were owed no duty.
43. Eric S. Bush, supra note 36 at 534.
44. White v. Jones, supra note 23 at 273 [Emphasis added].
45. Cited in Eric S. Bush, supra note 36 at 522.
46. Perry, "Protected Interests," supra note 21, n. 81.
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an undertaking, the manufacturer's contract is exhaustive of its objections
because it represents its only expression of assumed responsibility.47
2. The reliance
Proceeding, then, from a general understanding of an undertaking as
entailing an assumption of responsibility to do something in a reasonable
manner, I will now engage the second liability component arising from
Lord Morris's speech in Hedley Byrne. The basis for tort law's place in
loss of bargain cases - and the quality of the damage to which tort law
can be remedially applied - is the plaintiff's reasonable and detrimental
reliance on the defendant's undertaking, manifested by having altered his
or her position. The defendant's undertaking engendered the plaintiff's
dependency on the defendant, insofar as it induced the plaintiff to
entrust to the defendant an aspect of the plaintiff's personal autonomy
by foregoing other more beneficial courses of action that were open to
him or her. As such, an unfulfilled undertaking constitutes an interference
with the plaintiff's protected interest in his or her own autonomy to pursue
alternative available options.4"
While, therefore, the neighbour principle in Donoghue v. Stevenson
addresses harm consisting of physical damage to person or property, the
47. This was Brennan J.'s dissenting point in Bryan v. Maloney, supra note 11. The plaintiff was
the third owner of a house built seven years earlier by the defendant. Six months after her purchase,
she observed cracks appearing in the walls which were determined to have resulted from inadequate
foundations. At 184, he stated:
It would be anomalous to have claims relating to the condition of the building by an
original owner against the builder determined by the law of contract if the relief claimed
by a remote purchaser against the builder would be determined by the law of tort. Such a
situation would expose the builder to a liability for pure economic loss different from that
which he undertook in constructing the building and would confer a corresponding right on
the remote purchaser which the purchaser had not sought to acquire from the vendor.
[Emphasis added].
In a similar vein, Lord Scarman, in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd., [1986]
A.C. 80, [1985] 2 All E.R. 947 (P.C.) [Tai Hing cited to A.C.] said, at 107:
Their Lordships do not believe that there is anything to the advantage of the law's
development in searching for a liability in tort where the parties are in a contractual
relationship. This is particularly so in a commercial relationship ... [T]heir Lordships
believe it to be correct in principle and necessary for the avoidance of confusion in the
law to adhere to the contractual analysis: in principle because it is a relationship which
the parties have, subject to a few exceptions, the right to determine their obligations to
each other, and for the avoidance of confusion because different consequences do follow
according to whether liability arises from contract or tort, e.g. in the limitation of action.
48. See Perry, "Protected Interests", supra note 21 at 290:
... a foregone opportunity to act differently is appropriately treated as a loss in the tort
sense if the course of action B would have followed had he or she not relied on A would
have been preferable to the one actually taken. A loss of this kind is appropriately regarded
as an interference with B's autonomy interest, since that interest is constituted in part by
the nature and character of the opportunities or options in life that are available for one to
choose from.
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Hedley Byrne principle addresses the defendant's interference with the
plaintiff's right, exclusive as against the defendant, in his or her personal
autonomy to choose among multiple potential courses of action. Where
a manufacturer's conduct induces reasonable reliance in a subsequent
purchaser, it amounts to an undertaking which will engender liability.
Underlying this idea is a claim to a general principle of tort law: liability
for the consequences of one's actions arises from the inducement, by
way of an assumption of responsibility to refrain from risky conduct,
of another's reliance on the reasonableness of those actions. For this
reason, the idea of "undertaking" as a manifestation of an intention to
induce reliance implies a notion of "general reliance", which has been
recognized and applied by the House of Lords, and referred to by Lord
Steyn in Williams4 9 as the "extended Hedley Byrne principle."5 In Stovin
v. Wise,5 in considering the liability of a local council in respect of a
persistent problem of road visibility that had led to multiple accidents,
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said (in dissent):
Reliance calls for special mention. By reliance I mean that the authority
can reasonably foresee that the plaintiff will reasonably rely on the
authority acting in a particular way.... Reliance can be actual, in the
case of a particular plaintiff, or more general, in the sense that persons
in the position of the plaintiff may be expected to act in reliance on the
authority exercising its powers. In Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman,
157 C.L.R. 424, 464, Mason J. treated dependence as having equivalent
effect in some circumstances:
"there will be cases in which the plaintiff's reasonable reliance
will arise out of a general dependence on an authority's
performance of its function with due care, without the need
for contributing conduct on the part of a defendant or action
to his detriment on the part of a plaintiff. ... This situation
generates on one side (the individual) a general expectation
that the power will be exercised and on the other side (an
authority) a realisation that there is general reliance or
dependence on its exercise of power....,52
Lord Hoffmann, also citing Mason J.'s reasons in SutherlandShire Council
v. Heyman, added:
This ground for imposing a duty of care has been called "general
reliance." It has little in common with the ordinary doctrine of reliance;
the plaintiff does not need to have relied upon the expectation that the
49. Supra note 28.
50. Ibid. at 834.
51. Stovin v. Wise, [1996] A.C. 923, [1996] 3 All E.R. 801 (H.L.) [Stovin v. Wise cited to All E.R.].
52. Ibid. at 937-38.
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power would be used or even known that it existed. It appears rather
to refer to general expectations in the community, which the individual
plaintiff may or may not have shared. 3
Mason J.'s notion of general reliance founded upon "expectations" runs
up against the criticism (advanced by, among others, Lord Hoffmann) that
mere general expectations cannot, without something more, generate a
right - that is, a protected legal interest. The expectation must be grounded
in a plaintiff's undertaking, and the reliance must be correlative to that
undertaking. While, however, reliance must be demonstrated as having
specifically been induced in a particular plaintiff by the representation of
a particular defendant, reliance can in a sense be generalized within the
conception of tort liability that I am advancing (and in a way that would
not run afoul of Lord Hoffmann), insofar as it is to be inferred from that
representation. This was Lord Wright's point on the question of (inter alia)
a retail vendor's liability to a subsequent purchaser in Grant v. Australian
Knitting Mills Ltd. :14 "[I]t is clear that the reliance must be brought home
to the mind of the seller, expressly or by implication."55
An "implied" undertaking invokes a broad notion of reliance qua
component of the common law duty of care. By "general reliance", then,
I refer to the subsequent purchaser's reliance where it is inferred from
the fact that he or she makes a purchasing decision "in confidence" in
the manufacturer's undertaking that, in respect of a product or building
structure, it has employed reasonable care and skill in the manufacturing
process. The detrimental quality of such reliance is established where the
subsequent purchaser demonstrates that he or she, in making the purchase,
opted to forego other purchasing options.
The notion of general reliance which I am describing here is therefore
distinct from that enunciated by the House of Lords in Williams and in
Stovin v. Wise, as mine requires contributing conduct in the form of an
undertaking on the part of the defendant that operates to the plaintiff's
detriment by engendering actual reliance. Moreover, inasmuch as the
House of Lords relied on Mason J.'s reasons in Sutherland Shire Council
53. Ibid. at 954.
54. Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd., (1935), [1935] ALR 493, 54 C.L.R. 49, [1936] A.C. 85
(P.C.) [Grant].
55. Ibid. at 99. Grant was, strictly speaking, a sale of goods case, and the pertinent statutory
provision (South Australia's Sale of Goods Act, 1895, section 14), like other Commonwealth sale
of goods statutes, referred to a buyer making known to the seller "expressly or by implication" the
buyer's purpose in purchasing the goods. This reference, however, is to the buyer's communication to
the seller, not to the buyer's reliance. As to such reliance, the statute then (as now) required only that
the buyer "rely" on the seller's skill and judgment. Yet, Lord Wright ascribed to this bare reference to
reliance a dual quality: not only could it be express, but it could also arise "by implication."
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v. Heyman,56 its facts may allow us to distinguish it as a case of public
authority liability, and indeed Mason J. suggested that his notion of
general reliance would arise in cases involving direction of air traffic,
safety inspection of aircraft, and the fighting of a fire by a fire brigade. In
all such situations, he said, society as a whole has relied on the defendant
to discharge a task. 7
Tempting as it is to consign Mason J.'s notion of "general reliance" to
cases involving public authorities (and indeed, both the House of Lords58
and the Australian High Court 9 have attempted to do so), once one accepts
his notion of general reliance, there is no obvious reason to restrict its
application to public authorities. Indeed, Lord Browne-Wilkinson's speech
in White v. Jones,60 a case of a solicitor's negligence in attending to a
client's testamentary affairs, contains an example of such an application:
Although in any particular case it may not be possible to demonstrate that
the intended beneficiary relied upon the solicitor, society as a whole does
rely on solicitors to carry out their will making functions carefully.6"
Similarly, the British Columbia Court of Appeal has recently applied
the reasoning in White v. Jones to the provincial government's failure to
include a job-protection term in a license to harvest timber.62
The difficulty with "general reliance", so expressed, is that it purports
to allow recovery without the plaintiff having actually done anything
in reliance on the implied representation. Yet, such reliance - or, more
accurately, the detrimental quality of such reliance - is fundamental,
because it expresses the quality of the plaintiff's loss. Mason J.'s "general
reliance", moreover, misconceives reliance's relationship to an undertaking.
A proper judicial inference of reliance does not arise from the sole fact of
the manufacturer's undertaking of responsibility, nor from the sole fact
of a subsequent purchaser's decision to purchase. As Winkler J. stated
56. Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman, (1985), 60 A.L.R. 1, 157 C.L.R. 424 (H.C.A.) [Sutherland
cited to C.L.R.].
57. Ibid. at 464.
58. Certainly, the House of Lords appeared to assume such a restricted application in Stovin v. Wise,
supra note 51 at 829. Lord Hoffmann emphasized that if the doctrine of general reliance was to be
accepted, its application would require "some very careful analysis of the role which the expected
exercise of the statutory power plays in community behaviour."
59. In Pyrenees Shire Council v. Day (1998), 72 A.L.J.R. 152 (H.C.A.), Brennan C.J., joining
Gummow and Kirby JJ. in rejecting the doctrine of general reliance as it was articulated by Mason J. in
Sutherland, supra note 56, stated that the Council's liability for damage suffered is based in legislative
intention.
60. White v. Jones, supra note 23.
61. Ibid. at 276.
62. James v. British Columbia, 2005 BCCA 136, 38 B.C.L.R. (4") 263 at para. 49.
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in Carom v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd. ,63 "the representation must have caused
the recipient to act in a certain manner."'  After all, without a correlative
undertaking of responsibility by the manufacturer that actually induces
reliance, there is nothing in the manufacturer's conduct which corresponds
to the plaintiff's loss. Linkage between these two phenomena, then - the
undertaking and the decision taken by the plaintiff in confidence in the
undertaking - must be established because otherwise the plaintiff cannot
demonstrate an injury.65
3. Reclaiming warranty for tort law
There remains the matter of how, as a matter of doctrinal mechanics,
liability is to be imposed in cases of loss of bargain under the dual
Hedley Byrne elements of undertaking and reliance. I suggest that the
reliance-generating undertaking might be conveniently viewed as having
been transmitted through the device of warranty. This entails a revived
appreciation for the extra-contractual significance of a manufacturer's
undertaking to a subsequent purchaser - that is, of the legal significance
of an undertaking that is external to the manufacturer's contract with the
negligent purchaser - and a reconsideration of the "dogma that an innocent
misrepresentation of fact which induces a contract does not ... entitle the
representee to a remedy in damages against the representor. ' 66
Warranty was originally "a pure action [in] tort" 67 for deceit, brought
by a purchaser alleging that his or her purchase was made in reliance on
another's undertaking which was later proven to be false.68 The court
required no particular form of language or words to establish a warranty. It
merely inquired as to whether the undertaker had made a statement of fact
regarding the product such that he or she could be taken to have assumed
63. Carom v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd. (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 236, 138 O.A.C. 55, (S.C.).
64. Ibid. at 241.
65. See also Serhan Estate v. Johnson & Johnson (2004), [2004] O.T.C. 969, 135 A.C.W.S. (3d) 22
(Ont. S.C.), where Ground J., in the context of an application to certify a class action, stipulated that
each member of the proposed class would have to demonstrate reliance, and that whether a "rebuttable
inference of reliance arose" cannot be included as a "common issue" for the purpose of the class
proceeding (para. 60). At para. 59, he said: "Whether reliance should be inferred is a question of fact
and the answer may differ from individual to individual." This was later affirmed by the Divisional
Court- see 213 O.A.C. 298.
66. D.W. Greig, "Misrepresentations and the Sale of Goods" (1971) 87 Law Q. Rev. 179 [Greig,
"Misrepresentations"] at 179.
67. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 C.2d 453, 150 P. 2d 436 (Sup. Ct., 1944) [Escola] at 466,
per Traynor J. (as he then was).
68. J.B. Ames, "The History of Assumpsit" (1888) 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1; and Samuel Williston,
"Liability for Honest Misrepresentation" (1911) 24 Harv. L. Rev. 415. Lord Cooke, writing extra-
judicially in Robin Cooke, "An Impossible Distinction" (1991) 107 Law Q. Rev. 46 [Cooke, "An
Impossible Distinction"], said (at 59): "... until the time of Lord Holt an action for breach of warranty
was grounded in tort, being treated as a species of deceit."
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responsibility for the truth of its contents.6 9 The purchaser, whose decision
to purchase was made on the strength of the undertaker's statement of
facts, would then have a remedy where the undertaking's contents proved
false.
By the mid-eighteenth century, the practice had emerged of pleading
actions alleging a false warranty in assumpsit, because of certain
procedural advantages to a plaintiff in pleading assumpsit rather than case
(tort).7" The few commentators on this subject have emphasized that this
was merely a procedural shift, and did not reflect a substantive shift in
the basis of liability.7' The defendant's duty of care was still grounded
on an undertaking, amounting to an assumption of responsibility, and on
the purchase it induced. That is, the "warranty" was not viewed as a
necessarily contractual device. During the nineteenth century, however,
as the modem law of contract emerged from assumpsit and received
the device of warranty, courts inquired "to discover the necessary
consideration to support it."'T2 As a result, the prevailing view gradually
became that, for a purchase to have included a warranty, the purchaser had
to demonstrate a contractual intention whereby the subject undertaking
could form part of the contract. This ultimately led to the House of Lords'
pronouncement in Heilbut, Symons & Co. v. Buckleton,73 which confirmed
that an undertaking did not give rise to an enforceable warranty unless it
was made with an intent to contract.
Subsequent pronouncements attempted to circumvent Heilbut's
constraints by engaging in strained reasoning that ventured even
further from the eschewed rule. Typically, courts took advantage of the
69. Greig, "Misrepresentations," supra note 66 at 180. See, however, Chandelor v. Lopus (1603),
Cro. Jac. 4, 79 E.R. 3 (Ex.) at 4: "the bare affirmation that it was a bezar-stone, without warranting it
to be so, is no cause of action." The requirement of formal words of warranty was eventually dropped
and, by 1700, Lord Holt in Medina v. Stoughton (1700), 1 Salk. 210,91 E.R. 188 (K.B.) at 188 was able
to state:
Where one having the possession of any personal chattel sells it, the bare affirming it to be
his amounts to a warranty, and an action lies on the affirmation.
Nearly a century later, Buller J. in Pasley v. Freeman (1789), 3 T.R. 51, 100 E.R. 450 at 453, referring
to Medina v. Stoughton, stated:
... a distinction between the words warranty and affirmation ... is not law; ... an affirmation
at the time of sale is a warranty, provided it appear on evidence to have been so intended."
70. See in particular Williamson v. Allison (1802), 2 East 446, 102 E.R. 439 (K.B.) [Williamson cited
to East] where (at 451) Lord Ellenborough affirmed the basis of tort liability for breach of warranty,
and that the shift to assumpsit was essentially a matter of convenience:
The ancient method of declaring was in tort on the warranty broken, and that was just going
out of general practice when the case of Steuart v. Wilkins was discussed, because it was
found more convenient to declare in assumpsit for the sake of adding the money counts.
71. Waddams, Products Liability, supra note 2 at 5; Greig, "Misrepresentations", supra note 66 at
180.
72. Greig, "Misrepresentations", ibid. at 181.
73. Heilbut, Symons & Co. v. Buckleton [1913] A.C. 30 (H.L.).
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"notoriously elusive" nature of intent to find a statement to be a contractual
warranty "wherever the result that such a finding [would] lead them to
seem[ed] appropriate."74 This generally entailed judicial rationalization
of the undertaker's words as amounting to a warranty forming part of
a "collateral contract", separate from the main contract of sale, but in
respect of which the consideration is ostensibly the purchaser's entry into
the main contract of sale.75 Thus an action on an undertaking, in shifting
from an action in deceit upon a warranty to assumpsit, became subsumed
in the modem law of contract and its foundational inquiry into mutual
consideration.
Hedley Byrne can thus be understood as restoring warranty to its more
historically correct place in tort law, reviving a tort law remedy where
undertakings that are undischarged due to the undertaker's negligence have
induced their recipients to adopt a particular course of conduct.76 Such an
understanding of Hedley Byrne would bring Commonwealth tort law into
conformity with the concurring reasons of Traynor J. (as he then was) in
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. , who affirmed that "[w]arranties are not
necessarily rights arising under contract."78 More generally, this complete
understanding of the significance of a manufacturer's extra-contractual
undertaking demonstrates the poverty of the contractualist objections.
To assert a contract as delimiting a manufacturer's obligations (in the
absence of physical damage) denies any legal importance to infringements
of personal autonomy. By understanding the manufacturer's obligations
not to infringe another's autonomy, its obligations can be understood as
distinct from those arising under the law of contract. On the strength,
then, of "the tort character of an action on a warranty", a manufacturer's
liability should arise "under a warranty if the warranty is severed from
74. Waddams, Products Liability, supra note 2 at 134.
75. The predominance of the "collateral contract" approach was candidly acknowledged by Lord
Denning while speaking extra-judicially in response to David E. Allan, "The Scope of the Contract:
Affirmations or Promises Made in the Course of Contract Negotiations" (1967) 41 Aust. L.J. 274 at
293.
76. The "new" ideas, however, die hard. Jason Neyers in "Donoghue v. Stevenson and the Rescue
Doctrine: A Public Justification of Recovery in Situations Involving the Negligent Supply of
Dangerous Structures" (1999) 49 U.T.L.J. 475 at 493 criticizes Winnipeg Condominium on, inter alia,
the grounds that "the law will not recognize or infer a transmissible warranty of quality into structures"
and that "the only way that this right could exist is through a contract." Blackmun J. in East River,
supra note 10 at 868, recognized the dual contractual and delictual nature of such cases, but viewed
contractual liability principles as exclusively applicable, "the injury suffered" being "the essence of a
warranty action, through which a contracting party can seek to recoup the benefit of the bargain."
77. Escola, supra note 67.
78. Ibid. at 466.
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the contract of sale between the dealer and the consumer and based on the
law of torts."79
II. The doctrine applied: undertakings and reliance in loss of bargain
cases
I have canvassed the two foundational elements of the duty of care
propounded by the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne. First, a right is founded
in part on the defendant having given an undertaking such that it can be
taken as having assumed responsibility to do something in a reasonable
manner. Secondly, the defendant's liability depends on the plaintiff having
suffered loss as a result of having reasonably relied on the defendant's
undertaking. While this has been more conventionally understood as
applying to cases of negligent misrepresentation, my point here is that
no legal principle precludes the application of these duty determinants to
cases of loss of bargain.
Perhaps ironically, given the predominance of strict products liability
in U.S. law,8" U.S. jurisprudence imparts some instructive insights into this
basis for determining a manufacturer's liability in tort for loss of bargain.
It reveals, inter alia, the same devices of undertaking and reliance critical
to Hedley Byrne at work in the context of a general relationship. That is,
the undertaking in these cases is not confined to a particular subsequent
purchaser or to a particular transaction, but may take a more widely diffused
form of representation. Thus tort law can viably account for commercial
dealings, despite their considerable evolution from the emergence of
modem contract law in the nineteenth century to the modem consumer
and mass communications era in which Hedley Byrne was decided, with its
less directed representations such as mass advertising or product labelling.
Here the outcome of an objective inquiry into whether the representation
amounted to a legally significant undertaking will obviously depend on the
nature of the representation. It might be "puffery" or it might constitute
an inducement of reasonable reliance in the subsequent purchaser. That
this sort of representation is made to the public generally, rather than to
the subsequent purchaser specifically, further complicates the inquiry. It
does not, however, necessarily preclude recovery. We must still consider
whether the representation could reasonably be taken by its recipient as an
assumption of responsibility for the truth of its contents.
79. Ibid.
80. Or, more accurately, given the predominance of "strict liability theory [in generating] most of
the developing jurisprudence after about 1963." (Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts (West Group: St.
Paul, MN, 2001) at 971-72). Dobbs suggests that "whether, or to what extent, strict liability is actually
imposed" is currently an open question.
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A broadly targeted undertaking was considered by the New York Court
of Appeals in Randy Knitwear v. American Cyanamid Co.8' There, the
defendant, a chemical manufacturer, had furnished a fabric manufactured
with "Cyana", a resin intended to prevent fabric shrinkage. The plaintiff,
a clothing manufacturer, had acquired from an intermediary manufacturer
Cyana-treated material which it made into garments and sold to customers,
after which time "it was claimed that ordinary washing caused them to shrink
and to lose their shape." Although it alleged breach of an express warranty,
the plaintiff's evidence was that, in acquiring the fabric, it had relied upon
two forms of representations made by the defendant: advertising (both in
trade journals and in direct mail to clothing manufacturers including the
plaintiff)82 and labels or garment tags furnished by the defendant, bearing
the defendant's name and product identification, and stating: "This Fabric
Treated for SHRINKAGE CONTROL[.] Will Not Shrink or Stretch Out
of Fit[.]" 3
As to the advertisements, Fuld J. for (on this point) a unanimous court
observed:
Manufacturers make extensive use of newspapers, periodicals and other
media to call attention, in glowing terms, to the qualities and virtues of
their products, and this advertising is directed at the ultimate consumer
or at some manufacturer or supplier who is not in privity with them. ...
Under these circumstances, it is highly unrealistic to limit a purchaser's
protection to warranties made directly to him by his immediate seller.
The protection he really needs is against the manufacturer whose
published representations caused him to make the purchase.
... The manufacturer places his product upon the market and, by
advertising and labelling it, represents its quality to the public in
such a away as to induce reliance upon his representations. He
unquestioningly intends and expects that the products will be purchased
and used in reliance upon his express assurance of its quality and, in
fact, it is so purchased and used. Having invited and solicited the use,
the manufacturer should not be permitted to avoid responsibility, when
the expected use leads to injury and loss, by claiming that he made no
contact directly with the user.
8 n
Similar considerations applied specifically to the labels:
Equally sanguine representations on packages and labels frequently
accompany the article throughout its journey to the ultimate consumer
81. Randy Knitwear v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y. 2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S. 2d 363
(C.A. 1962) [Randy Knitwear cited to N.E.2d].
82. Unfortunately the court's reasons do not disclose the substance of the advertising.
83. Randy Knitwear, supra note 81 at 400 [Emphasis in original].
84. Ibid. at 402-03.
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and, as intended, are relied upon by remote purchasers.
Although we believe that it has already been made clear, it is to be
particularly remarked that in the present case the plaintiff's reliance
is not on newspaper advertisements alone. It places heavy emphasis
on the fact that the defendant not only made representations (as to
the nonshrinkable character of "Cyana Finish" fabrics) in newspapers
and periodicals, but also repeated them on its own labels and tags
which accompanied the fabrics purchased by the plaintiff from [the
intermediary].8Y
Such representations then, while made "to the public" in form are in
substance directed individually to every purchaser further down the
supply chain, including the ultimate consumer. Like any undertaking
forming part of the causal sequence leading to liability, they are objective
demonstrations of the manufacturer's intention to induce the receiver of
the undertakings to believe that he or she may rely upon the manufacturer
to accept responsibility for its contents.
Although the advertising and labelling in Randy Knitwear were each
considered separately, they were taken cumulatively as engendering the
necessary undertaking of responsibility.8 6 The adequacy of a representation
as a duty-engendering undertaking, assuming the form of, for example,
advertising alone or labelling alone, was left unclear. Three years after
Randy Knitwear, however, the Ohio Supreme Court in Inglis v. American
Motors Corp.87 considered the claim of a consumer purchaser of an
automobile against (inter alia) the manufacturer for breach of warranty and
negligence. The pleadings made various specific allegations of structural
and mechanical defects in the automobile, and further that the plaintiff's
purchase had been induced by representations contained in advertising
concerning the quality of the automobile's manufacture.88 In affirming the
lower court's judgment for the plaintiff, Herbert J. said:
The consuming public ordinarily relies exclusively on the representations
of the manufacturer in his advertisements. What sensible or sound
reason then exists as to why, when the goods purchased by the ultimate
consumer on the strength of the advertisements aimed squarely at him
do not possess their described qualities and goodness and cause him
85. Ibid.
86. This is particularly evident in Fuld J.'s reference to "advertising and labelling" as a representation
of "quality to the public in such a way as to induce reliance."
87. Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 209 N.E.2d 583, 32 0.0. 2d 136 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1965)
[Inglis].
88. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the purchase was induced by "representations ... made
... by advertising in mass communications media that Rambler automobiles were trouble-free,
economical in operation and built and manufactured with high quality workmanship."
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harm, he should not be permitted to move against the manufacturer to
recoup his loss. In our minds no good or valid reason exists for denying
him that right. Surely under modem merchandising practices the
manufacturer owes a very real obligation towards those who consume
or use his products. The warranties made by the manufacturer in his
advertisements and by the labels on his products are inducements to
the ultimate consumers, and the manufacturers ought to be held to strict
accountability to any consumer who buys the product in reliance on
such representations and later suffers injury because the product proves
to be defective or deleterious.89
Even allowing for the language reflecting the U.S. inclination towards
strict products liability, the analysis in Inglis is not as satisfying as that in
Randy Knitwear, as it is focused exclusively on the subsequent purchaser's
reliance, and gives no consideration to the scope of responsibility assumed
by the manufacturer. Irrespective of whether a finding of reasonable
reliance on the subsequent purchaser's part may support a finding that the
manufacturer assumed responsibility for the representation that induced
it, Inglis's grounding of liability exclusively on the plaintiff's reliance
truncates the liability analysis, which necessarily entails an inquiry into
the defendant's wrongdoing.
The reasoning of the California Superior Court in Free v. Sluss,90 where
the manufacturer's representation consisted only of labelling, is guilty of
the converse omission. There the court, observing that the label expressed
a "guarantee of quality", 9 found that this representation transcended the
manufacturer's privity-bound retailers and extended to the subsequent
purchaser. "It establish[ed]", Burch J. found, "the manufacturer's
knowledge and intention that the goods should move through the usual
channels of trade, and was a representation addressed to those who would
deal in its product."92  The representation therefore amounted to the
manufacturer's undertaking to the subsequent purchaser of responsibility
for the truth of its contents, on which basis liability could be imposed upon
the manufacturer. This analysis missed the undertaking's significance,
however, which lay in its impact upon the subsequent purchaser's choice.
The undertaking must have amounted to an interference with his or her
autonomy to choose from the available purchasing options, whether they
included competing brands, other products or the option of refraining
89. Inglis, supra note 87 at 616.
90. Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 933, 197 P. 2d 854 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1948).
91. Ibid. at 856. Specifically, the "guarantee" amounted to an offer to refund purchase money if the
soap did not meet with the purchaser's "entire approval."
92. Ibid. at 856.
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from making any purchase. 93 Consequently, while Free v. Sluss and Inglis
each apply only an aspect of the full duty of care analysis, the reasoning
in Randy Knitwear is complete, linking the plaintiff's loss with the
defendant's wrongdoing.
The practical significance of these dual elements of liability in the
context of the relationship between a manufacturer and a subsequent
purchaser is further illustrated in two contrasting decisions: those of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey in Santor v. Karagheusian, Inc.94 and of
the Supreme Court of California in Seely v. White Motor Company.95 In
a nutshell, whereas Santor articulated a broader "implied warranty" rule
(not predicated on any undertaking made by the manufacturer), Seely
required the plaintiff's demonstrated reliance on the manufacturer's
representation.
Santor, which preceded Seely by four months, arose from the plaintiff's
retail purchase of a "Gulistan" carpet manufactured by the defendant and
which, almost immediately after installation, developed a line down its
centre.96 The manufacturer had advertised the product as "Grade # 1" and the
plaintiff was aware of the advertising at the time of purchase. For the court,
however, Francis J. did not consider whether this advertising amounted to
an undertaking of responsibility for its contents by the manufacturer and,
if so, whether the plaintiff had in fact relied upon it in deciding to purchase
the rug. But for this, Santor ' contrast with Seely might have been less
pronounced. Instead, relying on the U.S. jurisprudence that established
strict products liability in cases of bodily injury or property damage, 97 he
derived an "implied warranty" of reasonable fitness from the fact of the
manufacturer's putting the product "in the channels of trade for sale to
the public", thus overcoming "the strictures of the long-standing privity
of contract requirement."98 Strict liability, Francis J. concluded, is thus
reflective of "public policy" 99 requiring imposition upon manufacturers of
a duty of care irrespective of whether the manufacturer was negligent or
had otherwise induced the plaintiff's reliance.
93. While the facts as recited in Free v. Sluss suggest that the plaintiff likely purchased in reliance on
the manufacturer's undertaking, that was not addressed in the reasons.
94. Santor v. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (Sup. Ct. 1965) [Santor cited to A.2d].
95. Seely v. White Motor Company, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1965) [Seely cited to
P.2d].
96. Eventually, other lines appeared.
97. In particular Henningson v. Bloomfield, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d. 69 (Supt. Ct., 1960) and Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d. 897 (Sup. Ct., 1963).
98. Santor, supra note 94 at 309, 311.
99. Ibid. at 311.
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In Seely, the plaintiff had purchased a truck from an intermediate
dealer by way of a printed purchase order issued by the manufacturer,
which stated:
The White Motor Company hereby warrants each new motor vehicle
sold by it to be free from defects in material and workmanship under
normal use and service, its obligation under the warranty being limited
to making good at its factory any part or parts thereof.
After finding that the plaintiff had relied on this in purchasing the truck,
Traynor C.J. (for the majority) directly addressed the Santor "implied
warranty," saying:
We are of the opinion, however, that it was inappropriate to impose liability
on that basis in the Santor case, for it would result in imposing liability
without regard to what representations of quality the manufacturer made.
It was only because the defendant in that case marketed the rug as Grade
#1 that the court was justified in holding that the rug was defective. Had
the manufacturer not so described the rug, but sold it "as is', or sold it
disclaiming any guarantee of quality, there would have been no basis for
recovery in that case. Only if someone had been injured because the rug
was unsafe for use would there have been any basis for imposing strict
liability in tort.
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical
injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and
does not rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff in having an accident causing
physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the
nature of responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing
his products. He can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries
caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety
defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm.
He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the
consumer's business unless he agrees that the product was designed to
meet the consumer's demands. 0
The prominence of strict products liability in Traynor C.J.'s reasons in
Seely might generate confusion for two reasons. First, since he had found
that the manufacturer had made an express representation to the plaintiff
determined the case in the plaintiff's favour, his reference to strict products
liability was, strictly speaking, superfluous.' 0' Traynor C.J.'s concern here
was, however, to rationalize the Uniform Commercial Code's allowance
for sellers to disclaim liability in certain circumstances, and strict liability
which would tend to the opposite conclusion, by delineating their respective
100. Seely, supra note 95 at 151.
101. For that reason, Peters J. argued in dissent, "[e]verything said by the majority on that subject is
obviously dicta." (Seely, supra note 95 at 153).
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scopes of application. The law required in his view a delimitation of the
limits of strict products liability at the boundary between loss of bargain
and cases involving an express warranty under the Uniform Commercial
Code. In doing so, he emphasized the fundamental elements, by then
familiar to Commonwealth jurisdictions by reason of Hedley Byrne, of
the duty of care. Such duty of care could not rest on the mere fact that the
manufacturer had placed an item on the market. Santor, he said, could be
justified only on the basis that the manufacturer had expressly held out the
carpet as being "Grade #1 ' ' 102 and on the plaintiff's demonstrated reliance
on such a holding out as an undertaking that the carpet is made to satisfy
his requirements.
The second potentially confusing aspect of the prominence of strict
products liability in Seely is the concept of an "implied warranty" which
Traynor C.J. rejected and upon which Francis J. based recovery in Santor.
This is a term of art, distinct from the implication of an undertaking of
responsibility derived from, for example, a manufacturer's express
representation as to quality. Santor's implied warranty is one which, in
a strict products liability regime, is imposed by law,"0 3 derived from the
placement of a product on the market, requiring no actual representation
of "reasonable suitability of the article manufactured for the use for
which it was reasonably intended to be sold."'" Conversely, the duty
of care imposed outside the confines of a strict products liability regime
requires (as Traynor C.J. required in Seely) an assumption of responsibility
demonstrated by an express representation that induces reliance.
Strict products liability aside, another complicating (but ultimately
informing) aspect of Seely is Traynor C.J. 's reference to "warranty recovery
for economic loss." Recall that warranty is commonly, but mistakenly,
understood as an exclusively contractual device.'015 This exclusivist view
was also evident in the larger context in which Seely was decided. After a
"sudden burst of rationalizing product cases as belonging to tort law rather
than to the warranty side",10 6 Seely represented "a halt, if not a retreat."'0 7
The critical point, however, is that the device of warranty (as distinct from
implied warranty) was being used in Seely not to describe a term of the
102. Traynor C.J. did not, however, consider whether that representation constituted "puffery."
103. Walter H.E. Jaeger, "Products Liability: The Constructive Warranty" (1964) 39 Notre Dame
Lawyer 501 at 506.
104. Santor, supra note 94 at 311. See also "'Note': Economic Loss in Products Liability
Jurisprudence" (1966) 66.2 Columb. L. Rev. 917 at 937.
105. See the text accompanying note 72.
106. Mark A. Franklin, 'When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-
Products Cases' (1966) 18 Stan. L. Rev. 974 at 979.
107. Ibid. at 979.
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contract between parties in privity, but the manufacturer's representation
to the subsequent purchaser from which an undertaking to be responsible
for the truth of the representation's contents could be inferred. Thus the
historically tortious nature of breach of warranty justifies the significance
of undertaking and reliance as duty components. That is, they are
constitutive of the circumstances giving rise to a duty of care, famously
expressed in Coggs v. Bernard,'0° where Gould J. justified imposing a duty
of care on a bailee:
The objection that has been made is, because there is not any
consideration laid. But I think it is good either way, and that any man,
that undertakes to carry goods, is liable to an action, be he a common
carrier, or whatever he is, if through his neglect they are lost, or come to
any damage. ... The reason of the action is, the particular trust reposed
in the defendant, to which he has concurred by his assumption, and in
the executing which he has miscarried by his neglect ... [I]f a man
takes upon himself expressly to do such a fact safely and securely, if the
thing comes to any damage by his miscarriage, an action will lie against
him. 109
"Warranty" then, both historically and as employed by Traynor C.J. in
Seely, is more completely understood not only as a contractual device, but
as the substance of an undertaking made to induce reliance.110 Inasmuch
as it causes the purchaser to relinquish some of his or her own personal
autonomy to the manufacturer's benefit, it gives rise to tort liability for
negligent manufacture of defective products or building structures.
III. Other issues: damages and evidence
I have established that, before liability may flow for loss of bargain in
the law of negligence, the subsequent purchaser must demonstrate an
undertaking, even if only in a diffuse or generalized form, and detrimental
reliance, which can be inferred from the subsequent purchaser's confidence
in the manufacturer's undertaking in making his or her purchasing decision.
108. Coggs v. Bernard, supra note 26.
109. Ibid. at 909. Holt C.J. (at 912) also affirmed that liability arose from the defendant's "undertaking"
to move goods and store them safely and, at 919, concludes that consideration is unnecessary by
reason of the plaintiff's reliance, expressed as "the owner's trusting him with the goods." Powell J.
agreed (at 910) that "the gist of these actions is the undertaking" which "obliges [the defendant] so to
do the thing, that the bailor come to no damage by his neglect." "[T]his action," he concluded (at 911),
"is founded upon the warranty ... [a]nd a man may warrant a thing without any consideration."
110. Here I am agreeing with William C. Pelster, "The Contractual Aspect of Consumer Protection:
Recent Developments in the Law of Sales Warranties" (1966) 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1430 at 1442. 1
disagree however with Pelster's overall thesis which would allow recovery for subsequent purchasers
by modifying the notion of privity. At the very least, I have attempted to show that such a development
would be unnecessary. I am also agreeing on this point with Cooke, "An Impossible Distinction,"
supra note 68 at 59.
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The permissible inference here is that, but for the undertaking, he or she
would have acted on another consumer option. Where the subsequent
purchaser can demonstrate these elements, then, what is the measure of
damage? In acting on another consumer option, the subsequent purchaser
would have had something reflecting the value that was actually paid. He
or she would have been better off as a result. Accordingly, he or she ought
to recover the difference between that value and the residual value (if any)
of the product or building structure.
For example, if the subsequent purchaser had paid $100 and the
residual value is $10, his or her recoverable damages would be $90. Two
important implications arise: first, the subsequent purchaser's recovery is
not determined by the price of the functional alternative product. That is,
he or she recovers $90, irrespective of whether the alternative also costs
$100, or more, or less. The measure of damages is governed by the cost
to him or her of having relinquished some of his or her own personal
autonomy in making consumer choices to the manufacturer's benefit. "1'
The second implication of the quantum of the subsequent purchaser's
damages is that recovery in tort may exceed the recovery that he or she
might have had under a contractual warranty. This would occur where
the value of the product or building structure is less than what he or she
paid for it, and where the contractual warranty provides for a functional
replacement (as opposed to a refund of the purchase price).
The plaintiff's underlying evidentiary burden raises more factual
variables than does the question of damages. The facts of Santor are
illustrative. Assume that Santor could have demonstrated that there were
competing carpet dealers of which he was aware at the time he purchased
the carpet. Assume also that he could have demonstrated those competitors
would have offered him a carpet combining the function and aesthetics
he sought and which he believed he was obtaining from Karagheusian.
Santor would then have had to prove that he was induced, by reason of
Karagheusian's representation, to forego an opportunity to purchase a
different and functional carpet elsewhere and instead to purchase the carpet
from Karagheusian. In doing so, Santor would have had to distinguish
Karagheusian's representation of the carpet as "Grade #1" from legally
11l. This is consistent with the principles governing recovery for negligent misrepresentation in the
law of torts, which require that "the plaintiff ... be put into the position it would have been in had
the misrepresentation not been made": BG Checo International Ltd. v. British Columbia Hydro and
Power Authority, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 12, 75 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145, 99 D.L.R. (4") 577 [BG Checo cited to
S.C.R.] at 37. This principle has also been applied by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Prince
George (City) v. Rahn Bros. Logging Ltd., 2003 BCCA 31, 9 B.C.L.R. (4"h) 253, 222 D.L.R. (4"1)
608.
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insignificant puffery which is not demonstrably reflective of an intention
to undertake responsibility for the carpet's quality.
If, for example, Santor had demonstrated that "Grade #1" represented
an industrial classification, then he ought to have succeeded on the basis
that the representation inaccurately implied a sufficiently particular
quality, such that it induced Santor to favour it over other available
competing products. Similarly, if the bald statement "Grade # 1" had been
accompanied in the advertisement with a more particular statement to
the effect that the carpet would maintain its aesthetic appearance over a
certain period of time, or would not develop lines, Santor also ought to
have succeeded. The more particular the representation, the more likely
it will demonstrate an underlying intent to induce reliance, and the greater
the consumer's ability to demonstrate actual and reasonable reliance.
If, conversely, the statement "Grade #1" had appeared by itself in the
advertisement unaccompanied by any other information regarding the
quality of the rug, or if instead it had not appeared in an advertisement but
in a banner hanging in the storefront window, it would have been open to
Karagheusian to argue that Santor could not have reasonably taken from
such a general, ambiguous statement that Karagheusian had undertaken
responsibility for the rug's quality. Were that the case, Karagheusian
could add, such puffery ought to have invited, at the very least, further
specific inquiries from Santor as to quality before Santor would have been
entitled to rely on anything Karagheusian told him.
The particularity of the representation and the context in which it
is given are, therefore, central to the inquiry. In Seely the representation
(warranting the truck to be "free from defects in material workmanship
under normal use and service") was more specific than Karagheusian's
"Grade #1" statement in Santor. The Seely representation also resembled
the language of a contractual warranty, which might in similar
circumstances influence a court in finding both an undertaking on the
part of the manufacturer to be responsible for the product's quality, and
justification for a consumer's reliance, thus mitigating if not overcoming
any concerns that might be posed by, for example, context. Absent such
particularity, context assumes greater significance inasmuch as the
governing principles may result in varying outcomes owing to divergent
commercial customs across communities and jurisdictions. The essential
point however is that both particularity and context of a representation
can be accounted for within an inquiry into the manufacturer's objectively
determined undertaking and the reasonableness of the consumer's
reliance.
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Conclusion
Commonwealth courts have struggled since Donoghue v. Stevenson with
claims arising from defective products and building structures, usually
by applying diverse "public policy" considerations. 1 2 As demonstrated
by the disparate qdality, taken together, of Commonwealth jurisprudence
generated over the past two decades, the results have been practically
and conceptually unsatisfying and, in the particular instance of Winnipeg
Condominium, invite the criticism of inconsistency with tort law's
parameters. It behooves us to consider alternative paths. Hence my
focus on examining afresh conceptions of "undertaking" and "reliance" as
fundamental liability components whose application extends beyond their
conventional confines of negligent misrepresentation or fiduciary duty
to define the liability inquiry in cases of defective products and building
structures.
While my analysis would result in a more pronounced shift towards
allowing plaintiffs' claims in cases involving defective products, their
ability to invoke this doctrine to obtain recovery in cases of defective
building structures might, as an empirical matter, be more limited.III It is
conceivable that instances of diffuse but legally significant communication
between builders and subsequent purchasers are less common, as builders
of residential or commercial structures might not generally engage in
substantive marketing to the same degree as, for example, automobile
manufacturers. Moreover, the builder would not be without defences,
even in the face of a specific representation. The now-common practice
of employing "home inspectors" to scan the structure for visible structural
defects would allow builders to argue that the subsequent purchaser's
conduct reveals, far from reliance on their representation, a deliberate
choice to rely instead on a third party. Accordingly, the approach which
I advocate might arguably lead to less frequent recovery for subsequent
purchasers of building structures than for subsequent purchasers of
products.
That said, it is hardly fanciful to foresee instances where subsequent
purchasers of building structures would be able to prove that a statement
112. See Venning J.'s compendium in Three Meade, supra note 1I and La Forest J.'s "compelling
policy reasons" in Winnipeg Condominium, supra note 13 (in the text accompanying note 16).
113. New Zealand courts might disagree, having, since Bowen, supra note 18 treated subsequent
purchasers of building structures as even more deserving of tort law's protection than subsequent
purchasers of products. This has been attributed to what Venning J. described in Three Meade, ibid.
(at 510) as "the particular social and historical context of home ownership in New Zealand," which
included a high proportion of owner-occupied housing; the extent of low-cost housing undertaken
by small-scale builders for individual purchasers; the nature and extent of government support for
homebuilding and ownership; the surge in homebuilding during the 1950s and 1960s; government
regulation of home construction; and the absence of any practice of house buyers to commission
engineering or architectural examinations.
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by a builder amounts to a reliance-inducing assumption of responsibility
for the building structure's quality, but for which they would have
acquired a satisfactory building structure that met their requirements. Sole
developers of large residential housing projects such as condominiums,
for example, typically engage in mass advertising to attract prospective
purchasers which will unavoidably reach subsequent purchasers as well.
It is conceivable, moreover, particularly in the case of high-end homes or
in high-market cities, that subsequent purchasers will contact the builder
in advance of making an offer to purchase in order to discuss general and
specific aspects of the construction and that they will rely on the builder's
assurances in reaching a decision to purchase the particular home. As
in the case of consumer products, the particularity of the content of the
builder's representation is critical to the subsequent purchaser's ability
to demonstrate the reasonableness of his or her reliance. An assurance
that the home is "well-built" or "should have no problems" would be less
likely to be viewed as having engendered reasonable reliance than specific
representations responding to specific inquiries about, for example, the
adequacy of foundations given subsoil characteristics, the adequacy of
ventilation in ceiling space or under external cladding, or the reliability of
sub-contractors.
Ultimately, some plaintiffs will succeed while others fail. This by
itself is no indictment. My inquiry has not sought to impose strict liability
for loss of bargain, but rather to construct a justificatory regime for its
recovery. That is, it has attempted to rationalize a juridical conception of
tort law's protection with the intuitive sense of "justice" that still leads
courts in Australia, Canada and New Zealand to impose, on varying and
not necessarily consistent bases inter se, liability for loss of bargain.
Any solution to that problem necessarily creates winners and losers. The
animating question does not go to divergent outcomes among parties, but
to the reason why a particular plaintiff or defendant wins or loses. Hence
my stress on the yardstick of whether a subsequent purchaser relied on
a manufacturer's extra-contractual undertaking. Irrespective of whether
a particular subsequent purchaser of a product or of a building structure
can meet that threshold for recovery, I have demonstrated a principled,
juridical solution to the general problem of loss of bargain.

